



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


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
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SUMMARY

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. UN will order Arab emigrants in Jordan to return to Israel:

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The UN Mixed Armistice Commission will order 850 Bedouins who left Israeli territory for Jordan in September to return to Israel. The Arabs are expected to resist repatriation because of fear that they will be forced to settle on unproductive land.

The American Consul General in Jerusalem predicts that Israel intends to make it so uncomfortable for its remaining Arabs that eventually they will all try to emigrate.

Comment: Officially, Israel practices no discrimination, but for security reasons it has placed some restraints on its 170,000 Arabs. This attitude is also motivated by a desire to make sufficient land available for Jewish immigrants.

4. Turkey changes attitude on Arab participation in MEDO:

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The British Foreign Office reported on 20 October that Turkish Prime Minister Menderes agreed during the recent

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British-Turkish talks in London that the formation of the Middle East Defense Organization should proceed without the Arab nations. Menderes nevertheless insisted that it would be better if they participated.

He suggested that Iraq rather than Egypt should be the first Arab state approached since Egyptian leadership of the Arab bloc had been weakened by suspicion of General Nagib's "republican tendencies."

Comment: Turkey had previously urged that one more attempt be made to obtain Arab cooperation before going ahead with the organization, and had suggested that since Egypt was clearly the key to Arab participation, it should be approached informally. It is possible that the Turkish attempt to sound out the Egyptians in early October failed.

American observers believe that the Egyptian position in the Arab world has been strengthened by the military coup, and there is no evidence that Iraq is prepared to lead the Arabs at this time.

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7. Pinay sees increased American aid necessary to EDC ratification:

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Prime Minister Pinay has assured the American Ambassador that the recent attacks against EDC by Herriot and other Radical Socialist leaders have not affected

the determination of the government to insist on ratification of the treaty.

Pinay stated, however, that the success of the government depended to a great extent on the maintenance of American military aid at a figure not less than that originally proposed by France; otherwise the government would be unable to refute parliamentary criticism of France's "inferior status" in EDC and NATO.

Defense Minister Plevin added that the government was unwilling to present the military budget on the basis of the present American aid figure and would postpone it until this matter was settled.

Comment: American assistance to France for 1953 is tentatively set at \$525,000,000 as contrasted with the French request for \$650,000,000.

Despite Pinay's qualified assurance, it still appears doubtful that the French Government can get the necessary National Assembly support for the EDC treaty in its present form. Growing demands for renegotiation and Pinay's determination to avoid staking his government on a foreign policy issue threaten an indefinite delay at best.

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